It may not be total detente, but China and the United States are entering a new, tentatively positive, diplomatic moment. New communication channels appear to stabilize a mutual downward spiral between the two superpowers that threatens to propel them inevitably toward conflict. The final channel to reopen is expected to take place next month, when US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin first meets his Chinese counterpart, Dong Jun, at the IISS Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore. Preparatory discussions between the United States and China have taken place in recent weeks, although relations remain tense.
It may not be total detente, but China and the United States are entering a new, tentatively positive, diplomatic moment. New communication channels appear to stabilize a mutual downward spiral between the two superpowers that threatens to propel them inevitably toward conflict. The final channel to reopen is expected to take place next month, when US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin first meets his Chinese counterpart, Dong Jun, at the IISS Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore. Preparatory discussions between the United States and China have taken place in recent weeks, although relations remain tense.
Perhaps more significant is the prospect of another new channel of communication, namely between the leaders of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and China’s Eastern Theater Command. If Beijing and Washington were to wage a war over Taiwan, these two figures would direct the military operations of each respective side. A military-to-military meeting between the two countries is unlikely to result in diplomatic breakthroughs. But the fact that it could happen is a welcome development – and, given the glacial silence of recent years, somewhat surprising.
In recent years, the Singapore conference has become a temperature gauge for Sino-US competition, much as the Munich Security Conference measures the pulse of Western relations with Russia. The last two Shangri La Dialogues took place against a backdrop of rapid deterioration in Sino-US relations, driven by incidents like Farrago’s ballooning in early 2022. The defense ministers of China and the United States did not are not even meeting face-to-face in 2023, settling for a perfunctory handshake at dinner. This year the mood will be different: Sino-US relations have improved over the past 12 months, albeit from a dangerously low level, so both ministers will likely avoid using their speeches as stands to aggravate tensions. (Disclosure: Until last year, I led the team in Singapore that puts on the event.)
Instead, this year’s focus in Singapore will be on Southeast Asia, given the recent clashes at Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea. Here, the Chinese coast guard deployed water cannons against Philippine ships seeking to resupply the Sierra Madre, a World War II landing ship that Manila ran aground on the reef more than two decades ago. The reef itself lies within the exclusive economic zone recognized by the Philippines, but is also inside China’s broad claims to much of the region. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who will speak at the conference, is clearly annoyed by China’s actions. But it is also irked by its Southeast Asian neighbors. Some of them also face Chinese incursions, but are far too intimidated by China to offer support to Manila.
Behind the scenes, however, attention will focus on developing military dynamics between the United States and China, and in particular on the possible new military path. The idea of a direct link between INDOPACOM and the People’s Liberation Army has been in the works for a long time. During their November 2023 meeting in Woodside, California, US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed that a link should be established. US Navy Admiral John Aquilino, who recently left the head of INDOPACOM, subsequently made several attempts to create it. Much to his frustration, the Chinese military never responded to his demands.
That could now change. Aquilino’s successor, U.S. Navy Admiral Samuel Paparo, took over last month. The arrival of a new commander, combined with the upcoming meeting of defense ministers in Singapore, is expected to create space for the start of a high-level military dialogue. We do not yet know exactly what format this dialogue will take, or even who the Chinese interlocutor will be.
This month, US Deputy Defense Secretary Ely Ratner spoke with his counterpart, Major General Li Bin, of China’s Central Military Commission. According to the American reading of the conversation, Ratner suggested that the commanders of the South and East China theaters of operations both be included in the regular calls. But if there is to be only one channel, the United States hopes it will be that of China’s eastern theater commander, who directs its military forces in crucial areas around Taiwan, rather than that of Southern Theater Command, which focuses on the South China Sea.
In recent years, communication between the U.S. and Chinese militaries has been weak to nonexistent. Aquilino spoke with Chinese officials during a meeting in Fiji in 2023. There was also a low-level meeting in early April, when Chinese military representatives traveled to Hawaii to meet with their INDOPACOM counterparts to what is known as the Military-Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group. , a technical discussion group on operational security. A second such meeting in China is now likely. But there has been little high-level communication – and none at all between the most important US and Chinese military commanders in the region.
A new military channel would also be important in a broader perspective, as part of a broader improvement in communication between Beijing and Washington. The most important channel remains that between Biden and Xi. In March, the two had a two-hour video call, which followed their cordial in-person meeting in California. These high-level meetings have, in turn, created space for other channels at ministerial level. The most important one is between the US national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi. But there are others, for example involving the country’s Treasury and Commerce departments.
There are, of course, good reasons to be skeptical about what a new inter-military chain can achieve. So-called military-to-military hotlines look good on paper, but often don’t achieve much in practice. Consider just one recent example: In 2023, Marcos and Xi agreed to establish such a hotline to manage tensions in the South China Sea. If such a thing exists, neither side has used it so far. In March, shortly after another maritime escalation by China, Marcos was asked in an interview whether some sort of personal line with Xi had been established. “Not yet, I’m afraid,” he said.
There are deeper structural challenges to overcome. The U.S. military is relatively decentralized, giving commanders like Paparo the authority to make decisions. The Chinese army is much more centralized and important decisions are made in Beijing. Communications between the two parties therefore often end up contradicting each other. Simply put, the United States wants to use bilateral forums to discuss and resolve substantive issues. China often views them more as a mechanism for complaining about American behavior. A retired senior Chinese army officer spoke to me during a recent trip to China. “The Americans can hold their meeting and make their arguments,” explained the official, while asking not to be given his name. “But our system is not like theirs. All our man can say is, “Thank you.” I will convey your concerns to Beijing.’”
Added to this is the problem that China often theatrically cancels these channels to express diplomatic displeasure, as it did after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022. Viewed cynically, it is conceivable that China would even have an interest in setting up a television channel. military, precisely because threatening to cancel gives Beijing leverage when it is dissatisfied with Washington. What’s more, the perverse reality is that emergency lines between the two superpowers are less likely to operate when they are most needed – during a real crisis – precisely because of China’s tendency to close them when relationships deteriorate.
That said, we shouldn’t be too pessimistic. Yes, diplomacy and dialogue are not panaceas, and any new military path would face significant problems. But the lesson of the last year is that they can also help stabilize relationships. At the very least, a functioning military channel should help avoid errors and misunderstandings, given that the U.S. and Chinese militaries are working with imperfect information. “It will allow us to say, ‘This is what we see.’ This is what it looks like for us,’” a senior INDOPACOM officer told me on condition of anonymity earlier this month. “And then we can ask ourselves: ‘Is this really the message you want to send us?’ »
At last year’s Shangri La Dialogue, Austin implicitly criticized China for refusing to participate in direct talks. “For leaders responsible for defense, the right time to speak is anytime,” he said. “And the right time to speak is now.” It looks like Austin will get his wish as China appears ready to talk again. We should not be naive about the results of such a dialogue. The long-term outlook for U.S.-China relations remains bleak. But as the world’s two most powerful militaries clash ever closer, some communication is definitely better than none at all.
