Photos of Sue Mi Terry’s Handwritten Notes: FBI Surveillance or NIS Mole Leak?


Redacted copies of Sue Mi Terry’s handwritten notes that she brought from a private meeting between the U.S. secretary of state and five Korea experts, including Terry, held on or about June 17, 2022, at the department’s building in Washington, D.C. Yonhap

Editor’s Note

This is the second and final in a two-part series on the indictment of Sue Mi Terry and its impact on the South Korean intelligence community.

By Kang Hyun-kyung

One question remains unanswered regarding the U.S. prosecution’s indictment of Sue Mi Terry for her alleged role as an unregistered agent for South Korea.

How did the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtain the two photos containing Terry’s notes taken during or before the private, undisclosed meeting between the U.S. Secretary of State, senior State Department officials, and five Korea experts, including Terry, held on June 22, 2022, at the State Department building?

Both photos were taken by an unnamed South Korean intelligence officer working for the National Intelligence Service (NIS), identified as the “NIS-3 official” in the indictment.

According to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the NIS-3 official took the photos of the two-page notes with his smartphone in a car registered to the South Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C. after the private meeting. Redacted copies of the photos were included in the indictment.

The U.S. attorney’s office presented the photos as evidence supporting allegations that Terry worked for the South Korean government without registering as a foreign agent, saying she violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

Terry, however, denied the allegations. In an interview with the Chosun Ilbo, Terry’s lawyer claimed that she had written the notes “before” attending the meeting and that they were her “talking points,” not what she had written during the private meeting with the U.S. secretary of state.

The timing of the notes appears to be a key factor in determining Terry’s motives. If the notes were written before the meeting and included her talking points, as Terry claimed, that would weaken the charge that she shared undisclosed U.S. government information with South Korean intelligence officials. On the other hand, if the notes were written during the meeting and summarized what was discussed, which was supposed to remain confidential, that would raise suspicions about Terry’s motives.

Another crucial question that needs to be clarified in assessing the impact of Sue Mi Terry’s indictment on South Korea and its intelligence services is how the FBI obtained the photos. Were they taken by FBI agents or undercover agents working for U.S. intelligence agencies? Or did the FBI obtain them from sources outside the U.S. government?

These questions were raised because the indictment did not specify the source of the photos.

In South Korea, the issue of “disappearing photo credits” has sparked a heated debate over the sources of these images. Experts believe that if people outside the U.S. government were involved in the FBI’s acquisition of the photos, it could have a significant impact on South Korean intelligence.

Opinions are divided on the sources, and two schools of thought present different interpretations on the missing photo credit and its potential impact on the NIS.

Representative Park Sun-won of the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) said the photos were likely the result of FBI cyber activities.

“If true, this is a serious issue,” he said on a KBS radio show on July 19. “(As stated in the indictment document), these photos were taken by an NIS agent and stored on his smartphone. The fact that the FBI secured this secret information that was on the NIS agent’s smartphone could indicate that the information on all NIS agents and South Korean diplomats based in the United States and their smartphones has been compromised.”

Park served for four years at the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in three different capacities during the previous Moon Jae-in administration. He first joined the NIS as a foreign policy and security adviser to then-NIS Director Seo Hoon. He was later promoted to deputy director, overseeing planning and coordination, and eventually served as first vice director in charge of overseas operations before leaving the NIS.

Within the National Assembly, Representative Park is simultaneously a member of two committees, the National Defense Committee and the National Assembly Intelligence Committee.

He was elected from Bupyeong B constituency in Incheon on the DPK ticket in the National Assembly elections held in April.

Sue Mi Terry, left, and an intelligence officer identified as “NIS-3 official” in the indictment walk toward a car with diplomatic license plates registered to the South Korean Embassy in Washington DC after purchasing a Louis Vitton handbag at a store in Washington DC on April 16, 2021. Yonhap

NIS moles?

While the DPK lawmaker suggested that FBI cyber surveillance could be the source of Terry’s photographed notes, another intelligence expert, who previously worked at the NIS for 20 years, said the possibility of intentional internal information being leaked to the FBI cannot be ruled out.

Choe Su-yong, a former NIS agent who worked on covert operations involving North Korea, said the photos of Terry’s handwritten notes may have been passed to the FBI by a “double agent” within the NIS.

“I think it may be an act committed by a mole within the NIS,” he told The Korea Times. Moles are spy agents who infiltrate a targeted intelligence agency with the aim of selling its secrets to a foreign intelligence agency.

As seen in other countries’ intelligence agencies, Choe said there were almost certainly moles within the NIS.

Choe said there were moles working for foreign intelligence agencies and this time they could be those operated by North Korea. He added that the indictment of Sue Mi Terry could be the result of a covert operation by North Korean sympathizers.

Even if the accusation is true, one question remains: What is the purpose of the moles engaging in such activities? In other words, how could North Korea benefit from Terry’s indictment?

Choe said North Korea would certainly benefit from the departure of its fierce critic, Terry.

Some intelligence experts shared a similar view to Choe regarding the possible existence of moles within the NIS.

Poster of the film “Beyond Utopia”

Citing a source familiar with North Korea, Choe said Terry had become a prime target for deportation following the release of the documentary film “Beyond Utopia” in 2023. The film, in which Terry stars, depicts the perilous journeys of North Korean escapees, highlighting the harsh living conditions and serious human rights violations they face.

“I heard that the film infuriated North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and he ordered his deputies to do everything they could to remove Terry,” Choe said.

In an interview with the Chosun Ilbo newspaper, several anonymous sources suggested that the NIS may be looking to identify the mole from the inside to determine whether insiders have leaked information to foreign governments. One anonymous source said, “When an agent’s covert operation is revealed to a foreign country, intelligence agencies usually conduct an internal investigation to detect whether someone from the inside contributed to the leak. The NIS would follow the same protocol, as searching for moles is standard procedure in such situations.”

If these accusations prove true, the NIS, already under pressure to reform, will face even greater demands for transformation, likely leading to major shakeups within the agency.

Rumors are circulating due to the lack of photo credits in Terry’s photographed notes, following media reports of his indictment for FARA violations.

In the indictment, the U.S. Attorney’s Office said the NIS official identified as Manager 3 photographed two pages of handwritten notes that Terry had brought from his meeting with the U.S. secretary of state.

“The notes were written on the letterhead of Think Tank-2 where Terry had recently worked,” he said, showing redacted copies of the photos. The prosecutor’s office did not specify the source of the photos.

Other photos included in the indictment have a clear origin, as the prosecutor’s office clarified. For example, the photos showing NIS agents 2 and 3 buying luxury bags were accompanied by a note indicating that the images came from the surveillance cameras of the respective stores.

There is another photo whose source the U.S. Attorney’s Office did not specify. It shows Terry dining with the NIS-2 head and his successor, the NIS-3 head, at a Greek restaurant in Manhattan in August 2022. Unlike the other photos included in the document, this image lacks specific information about when it was taken.



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